A recent study shows that, in social insects where workers suppress or 'police' the reproduction of nestmate workers, only a subset of workers act as police. This confirms that policing can serve a collective rather than a selfish interest.
Ambrose Bierce [1] defined a legal oath as ''a solemn appeal to the Deity, made binding upon the conscience by a penalty for perjury''. Insect societies have no laws or religion, but the altruism of their workers, who labour for the colony even to the point of abstaining from reproduction, may similarly be reinforced by punishment or coercion. Hamilton's kin selection theory [2] showed the fundamental basis of reproductive altruism in workers to be their genetic relatedness to the reproductives (new queens and males) that they rear. The sharing of genes inherent in kinship means that raising relatives promotes the spread of genes for altruism. Kin selection theory therefore explains altruism not as something imposed on workers, for example by the queen, but as a genetically selfish behaviour performed in the workers' own evolutionary interests.
Ratnieks [3] added an important refinement to this picture. Because of haplodiploidy in ants, bees and wasps -whereby female workers and queens develop from fertilized eggs and are diploid, while males develop from unfertilized eggs and are haploid -even workers incapable of mating are potentially able to produce their own male offspring [4] . Ratnieks [3] showed that the relatedness structure of insect colonies could create selection for workers to prevent their fellow workers from reproducing. He predicted such 'worker policing' to stem, not from direct reproductive competition between individual workers, but from selection for genes for policing performed in the workers' collective interest. In the honey bee Apis mellifera, workers were subsequently found to perform policing either by selectively consuming nestmate workers' eggs [5] or by attacking nestmate workers with activated ovaries [6] . These forms of worker policing have since been documented in many species of ants, bees and wasps [7] . Now a new study by van Zweden et al. [8] has demonstrated that, in the ant Pachycondyla inversa, some non-laying workers specialize in policing their nestmates. So a division of labour exists among workers for policing, as it does for everyday labouring tasks such as foraging, brood-rearing and nest-construction [9, 10] . In effect, this ant has exchanged a Neighbourhood Watch scheme, in which everyone keeps an eye on everyone else, for a professional police force. This discovery supports the idea that policing evolves because it serves a collective interest.
In the honey bee, the relatedness structure of the colony promotes worker policing because, as a result of the queen's high mating frequency, each worker is related to males in the order: own sons, relatedness 0.5; queen's sons, relatedness 0.25; other workers' sons, relatedness w0.125. This means that, given policing, each worker effectively rears its more closely related brothers (queen's sons) instead of less closely related sons of other workers [3] . Of course, any one worker would still have greater fitness if it could produce all the colony's males (relatedness 0.5). But a single worker is unlikely to have the power to monopolize male production. By contrast, mutual policing among the workforce as a whole is entirely achievable. So policing occurs because workers, acting as a collective, not only gain fitness but also hold the required monopoly of practical power. Later research showed that efficient policing selects for workers not to attempt reproduction in the first place [11] . So the altruism of workers in species with policing may stem from relatedness initially but be backed up by the possibility of direct prevention of reproduction.
Ratnieks [3] also showed that policing could be positively selected in the absence of relatedness benefits if it made colonies more productive. Evidence supports both relatedness and productivity benefits as important influences on the occurrence of policing [12, 13] . Low frequencies of workers with active ovaries in species with effective policing and low relatedness have also confirmed a dual effect of relatedness and policing on worker reproduction [14] . An alternative reason for policing is direct selfishness. Perhaps policing workers are themselves reproductive and aim to suppress the egg-laying of rivals. Such 'corrupt' policing is suspected in the wasp Dolichovespula sylvestris [15] . It is essentially identical to the dominance behaviour familiar from some other social insects (for example [16] ) and other social animals altogether [17] , in which rank reflects reproductive status. The new research by van Zweden et al. [8] advances our understanding of worker policing by establishing that, in a system where policing is not 'corrupt', policing is subject to division of labour.
Pachycondyla inversa (Figure 1 ) is a large ponerine ant found in Brazil. Colonies contain a few dozen workers and one to several unrelated, multiply-mated queens, and so have a relatedness structure promoting policing [18] . Using captive nests with individually marked workers, van Zweden et al. [8] performed two experiments. In the first, colonies were split by separating some of the workers from the main nest, which contained the queen or queens, with a wire screen. The separated workers activated their ovaries and began to lay eggs. The investigators then reintroduced these workers to the main nest one at a time and recorded the identities of any resident workers attacking them. Later, they assessed the reproductive status of all workers by ovarian dissection. In the second experiment, the investigators added queen-laid or worker-laid eggs singly to target colonies. They then recorded the fate of the eggs and the identities of the workers handling them.
In the first experiment, the reintroduced workers with the most active ovaries were attacked most frequently by the resident workers, suggesting that the function of the attacks was to police reproduction. Policing workers lacked active ovaries and so were not behaving 'corruptly'. In addition, although many resident workers participated in policing, the distribution of policing attacks among them was highly uneven, with some never policing and others performing more policing than expected by chance.
In the second experiment, as expected [18] , workers from the target colonies selectively ate worker-laid eggs, but the distribution of egg-eating among them was again uneven, although less strongly so than the distribution of policing by aggressive attacks in the first experiment. Tellingly, in both experiments, the first worker to encounter an introduced reproductive worker or a worker-laid egg was usually not the worker that eventually policed it (by attacking or eating, respectively); there were few citizen's arrests. Overall, the study showed that some non-reproductive workers are non-policers, whereas others specialize in policing. So policing is subject to a division of labour, either in its own right or through being associated with other tasks or suites of tasks for which a division of labour exists [8] .
Division of labour evolves in insect societies because it improves colony efficiency among tasks benefiting the colony as a whole [19] . The findings of van Zweden et al. [8] are therefore consistent with the idea that policing can reflect the evolutionary interests of workers acting as a collective. Presumably the need to keep policing effective prevents the proportion of workers serving as police from falling too low. In human societies, law-abiding citizens accept that society requires policing and that it is more efficient if just some members of society become police. This way, policing is also subjected to a division of labour. In social insects, despite their lack of laws and religion, it appears that natural selection has fashioned a similar system.
